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Of Sheepdogs and Ventriloquists:
Government Lawyers in Two New Deal
Agencies
DANIEL R. ERNST†
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science,
John Henry Schlegel’s masterful study of how a circle of
American law professors, seeking a professional identity
within the modern university, tried on but then discarded
the garb of social scientists, performs a very difficult
historical feat: it presents its subjects’ thought with great
depth and subtlety but also as a means to an end in a fully
rendered social setting, the American law school in the first
decades of the last century. For any legal historian trying to
work out how to write about ideas not just “in the books” but
also “in action,” to see them as part of professionals’ quest for
authority, and to draw upon sociological theory without
derailing a narrative throughline, the book has been an
indispensable model. It certainly has been for me as I have
studied the lawyers of the New Deal. Few of those lawyers
appear in Schlegel’s book and then only in supporting roles.
They worked in vast government buildings rather than
academic cloisters.

†Georgetown University Law Center.
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But for New Deal lawyers quite as much as for Schlegel’s
Legal Realists, ideas were their stock-in-trade, employed in
pursuit of professional power.
*****
“Research on state building in the U.S.,” writes the
political scientist Gerald Berk, “usually holds twentiethcentury governance to a single set of standards, namely those
of Weberian (or Prussian) bureaucracy: autonomy,
hierarchy, legitimate authority, professionalism, and the
capacity to monitor and control economic behavior.”1
Typically it emphasizes the United States’s departure from
a continental European norm. European nations
bureaucratized before they democratized, but the United
States adopted universal white male suffrage before it
created
many
centralized,
locality
penetrating
2
bureaucracies. When it came to America, bureaucratic
autonomy, the condition in which “a politically differentiated
agency takes self-consistent action that neither politicians
nor organized interests prefer but that they either cannot or
will not overturn or constrain in the future,” rarely proceeded
from the top down, through orderly hierarchies of
specialized, full-time officials.3 Rather it emerged in the
middle of federal executive departments as bureau chiefs and
other “mezzo-level” bureaucrats recruited nonpartisan
staffs,
developed
state
capacity,
and
cultivated
4
constituencies.
Scholars of American political development have long
recognized that the legal profession has had an outsized role
in building the national state. Stephen Skowronek, for

1. Gerald Berk, The National Recovery Administration Reconsidered, 25
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 56, 83 (2011).
2. MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE, at 14–15 (1994).
3. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–
1928, at 17 (2001).
4. Id. at 167.
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example, considered lawyers the “special intellectual cadre”
that ran the nineteenth-century state of courts and parties.5
Further, the sociologist Terence Halliday has distinguished
two ways in which lawyers engage in politics, turning on the
nature of the authority they assert. “Technical” authority
arises from the special expertise of the professional.6 For
lawyers, Halliday mentioned “skill in understanding
statutes, drafting contracts, and executing corporate
mergers,” which lawyers can exercise “without taking an
explicit stand on what the law should contain.”7 “Normative”
authority relates to “broad issues of public policy concerning
which every citizen should be in a position to come to a
decision.”8 Lawyers are most authoritative when they invoke
their technical authority, but because lawyers have
“technical authority in a normative system,” they have “an
unusual opportunity to exercise moral authority in the name
of technical advice” and “exert enormous influence in great
tracts of social life.”9
When I started in on a book on New Deal lawyers with
such literatures in mind, I expected to find my subjects
employing their technical authority to bring the responsible
executive and bureaucratic autonomy to the federal
government. I pictured them as sheepdogs, nipping at the
heels of potentially wayward administrators. By
authoritatively interpreting statutes, they would help
agency heads keep mezzobureaucrats in line. By requiring
that orders be supported by finding of facts on a record, they
would keep officials from wandering into the arms of
businesses and professional politicians. Sometimes the
5. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION
at 31 (1982).

OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920,

6. TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES,
PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 38 (1987).

AND

7. Id. at 39.
8. Id. at 37 (quoting A.M. CARR-SAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS
486 (1933)).
9. HALLIDAY, supra note 6, at 40–41.
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lawyers behaved just this way, but, even then, they followed
their own professional and political instincts rather than
simply heeding their master’s voice.
Consider the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(AAA). It was created within the US Department of
Agriculture and formally subject to Secretary Henry A.
Wallace to establish marketing agreements and production
controls to give farmers the buying power they enjoyed before
the outbreak of World War I.10 Its administrator, George
Peek, had wanted Wallace’s job and extracted a promise of
direct access to FDR before taking the position.11 Wallace’s
assistant secretary was Rexford Tugwell, an institutional
economist who, with two other Columbia professors, formed
FDR’s “brains trust” during the 1932 campaign.12 Jerome
Frank, a corporation lawyer and sojourner among Yale’s
legal realists, was formally Peek’s general counsel, but
functionally Wallace’s and Tugwell’s agent within AAA.13
Wallace, Tugwell, and Frank shared Wallace’s apartment in
the first days of the New Deal; for a while thereafter, Frank
and Tugwell shared other quarters and became good
friends.14
Wallace, Frank and Tugwell were all for raising farmers’
income but all against allowing food processors to pad their
profits. Peek, formerly president of a farm implement
company, was much less solicitous of the consumer, even
though the statute directed AAA to “protect the consumers’
interests” as well as to establish parity prices.15 But for the
10. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 45–49 (1958).
11. VAN L. PERKINS, CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE: THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT
ADMINISTRATION AND THE NEW DEAL, 1933, at 83, 86–87 (1969).
12. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933–1937: A HISTORY 20,
49 (1986).
13. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK 23, 74–75, 155–56 (Oral Hist.
Rsch. Off., Columbia Univ. ed., 1960); ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST
AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 18–19, 22–25 (1985)
14. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 13, at 25, 72, 81, 115.
15. PERKINS, supra note 11, 95–96; GILBERT C. FITE, GEORGE N. PEEK AND THE

2021] OF SHEEPDOGS AND VENTRILOQUISTS

47

Agricultural Adjustment Act, the marketing agreements
would violate the antitrust laws. To ensure that they were
within the antitrust exemption, Frank’s legal division, which
included Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, and Abe Fortas,
carefully reviewed their terms and insisted on access to the
books and records of the food processors.16 Peek and his
subordinates, recruited from industry, generally joined in
the processors’ resentment of the lawyers’ “captious legal
objections.”17
Early on, Peek’s subordinates complained that the
lawyers were assuming a policymaking role invested in the
AAA’s administrators.18 Frank replied that the legality of the
marketing agreements turned on the scope of Congress’s
delegation in the Agricultural Adjustment Act and, for
agreements beyond it, the reasonableness of their restraint
of trade. To resolve those issues, his lawyers could not
possibly “draw a nice line between policy and law” and
“dismiss all questions of policy as none of our business.”19
Peek pushed back hard; Frank, reassured by Tugwell, held
his ground until Wallace forced Peek out in December 1933.
For months thereafter, the lawyers proceeded confident that
in resisting the administrators they were doing Wallace’s
FIGHT FOR FARM PARITY 21–37 (1954); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 602(3) (1934).
16. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 95; PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 124–
25, 132 (1982).
17. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 93–94; Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric.
Adjustment Admin., Dairy Marketing Agreements and Licenses at the American
Institute of Cooperation 15 (July 9, 1934) (on file with the Jerome New Frank
Papers, Yale University Library). Peter Irons provides the fullest account of
Frank at AAA. See generally IRONS, supra note 16, at 111–32, 156–80 (1982). He
also identified disharmony between chief administrators and general counsels as
one of “four major sources of political conflict” experienced by New Deal lawyers.
IRONS, supra note 16, at 10.
18. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment
Admin., to George N. Peek, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Sept. 8, 1933) (on
file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
19. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment
Admin., to George N. Peek, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Oct. 25, 1933) (on
file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).

48

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

bidding.20 Only when they set their professional authority
against the political might of the Cotton South over the
rights of sharecroppers did Wallace balk and acquiesce in the
“purge” of Frank, Pressman, and others.21
For a contrast, consider the National Recovery
Administration (NRA). The National Industrial Recovery Act
authorized the president to promulgate codes of fair
competition for individual industries. As at AAA, an
extremely able group of lawyers (including Thomas
Emerson, Milton Katz, and Stanley Surrey) advised
administrators overwhelmingly recruited from business.22
Once again, the basis for the lawyers’ claim of authority was
statutory: did a code advance the policies of the statute or did
it let industrialists enjoy monopolistic profits?23 Once again,
when lawyers insisted on defining the antitrust exemption,
administrators accused them of exceeding their role. One,
who thought of NRA codes as “charters of self-government,”
claimed not to see that the agency’s lawyers had raised “a
legal objection” to a code.24
NRA differed from AAA in at least one important
respect. At AAA, Frank plausibly claimed to be
implementing the policies of Secretary Wallace. At NRA, a

20. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 20, 1935) (on file
with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library); IRONS, supra note
16, at 128–32; THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 13, 167–68.
21. DAVID EUGENE CONRAD, THE FORGOTTEN FARMERS: THE STORY
SHARECROPPERS IN THE NEW DEAL 136–53 (1965).

OF

22. S. DOC. NO. 73-164, at 191, 197, 209; see KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA
SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL 94–95 (1995).
23. NIRA also forbid codes “designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate
or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them.”
National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2) (1934), invalidated by
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
24. Dudley Cates, A Current Appraisal of the National Recovery
Administration, 172 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 135 (1934);
Memorandum from Dudley Cates to Hugh S. Johnson (Aug. 18, 1933) (on file with
the Records of the National Recovery Administration, National Archives at
College Park, Maryland).
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Brookings Institution study found, “there existed no real
policy-making body.”25 The Administrator, Hugh S. Johnson,
was a former cavalry officer and had overseen the draft
during World War I.26 He approached FDR’s charge to NRA
“to get many hundreds of thousands of the unemployed back
on the payroll by snowfall” as urgently as he had the creation
of the American Expeditionary Force.27 To arrest the
downward spiraling economy, Johnson instructed his
subordinates “to get the codes in” at once and deal with
abuses if and when they arose.28 Negotiations took the form
of “plain horse trading and bare-faced poker playing,” as
administrators agreed to price controls and production
limitations in exchange for pledges of minimum wages,
maximum hours, and the observance of the right to organize
and bargain collectively.29
General Counsel Donald Richberg agreed that
industrialists had to be coaxed into code-making and
directed his lawyers to acquiesce in even dubious
provisions.30 Despite this retreat, lawyers found that
administrators, “looking in desperation for some source of

25. Leverett S. Lyon et al., The National Recovery Administration: An
Analysis and Appraisal, in THE INST. OF ECON. OF THE BROOKINGS INST. 3, 61
(1935).
26. JOHN KENNEDY OHL, HUGH S. JOHNSON AND THE NEW DEAL 10–15, 20–35
(1985).
27. Text of Roosevelt Statement on Aims of Industrial Bill, HARTFORD
COURANT, June 17, 1933, at 1.
28. Press Release No. 2993, Hugh S. Johnson, Nat’l Recovery Admin., Address
before the Worcester Chamber of Com., Worcester, Massachusetts 5 (Jan. 25,
1934) (on file with the Library of Congress).
29. Hugh S. Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth, SATURDAY EVENING
POST, Jan. 26, 1935, at 91; BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE NRA 45–48
(1975); COLIN GORDON, NEW DEALS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA,
1920–1935, at 174 (1994).
30. See THOMAS E. VADNEY, THE WAYWARD LIBERAL: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
DONALD RICHBERG 124–35 (1970); Memorandum from Blackwell Smith to
Members of the National Recovery Administration Legal Division, Policy Matters
(Sept. 11, 1933) (on file with the Blackwell Smith Papers, American Heritage
Center, University of Wyoming).
OF
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advice detached from any one of the special interests
represented in the code bargaining process,” sometimes
turned to them. On such occasions, their advice went “beyond
the issues of law, far into the realm of general policy.”31
Conflicting signals from the top allowed lawyers to
acquire this authority. Johnson acted as “a mere arbitrator
among warring groups with their relative strengths
determining the final formulation of policy.”32 After his
behavior became intolerably erratic, he was forced out in
September 1934.33 His replacement, a board representing
the conflicting factions, did little better.34 In April 1934,
Associate General Counsel Blackwell Smith had been named
“assistant administrator of policy” as well as de facto head of
the legal division;35 he and his lawyers never succeeded in
imposing their policies on the code authorities before
Schechter rang the curtain down.36
At AAA and NRA, lawyers were not or not simply
committed to making federal bureaucracies more closely
approximate Max Weber’s ideal type.37 Recall my
government-lawyer-as-sheepdog metaphor. Sheepdogs react
reflexively to their masters’ commands; the New Deal
lawyers displayed rather more agency. “We young fellows
were well aware of the varied crew that manned the New
Deal ship of state and that some of our crusading efforts had
to be directed inwards,” Alger Hiss recalled of his AAA
31. Lyon et al., supra note 25, at 63–64.
32. LEVERETT S. LYON & VICTOR ABRAMSON, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE
1040 (1940).
33. See OHL, supra note 26, at 240–54.
34. BELLUSH, supra note 29, at 158–75.
35. Id. at 155 n.2; see VADNEY, supra note 30, at 129.
36. LYON & ABRAMSON, supra note 32, at 1038–39 n.6; Lyon et al., supra note
25, at 742. On May 27, 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the National
Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 956–58, 974–75 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich, eds., 1978).
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days.38 “For example, Peek was out of step with what we
believed was the ‘true’ spirit of the New Deal; Wallace and
Roosevelt, our leaders and champions, of course exemplified
the ‘true’ spirit. So Peek’s discomfiture and exit seemed to us
part of the script.”39
Jerome Frank provides an unusually revealing view of
one of the New Deal lawyers’ tactics, the projection, in
something approaching an act of ventriloquism, of their
normative preferences onto the law, which they then invoked
in an assertion of technical authority. Like other New Deal
lawyers, Frank regularly asserted a technical expertise
grounded in positive law. Milk licenses, for example, had to
“be measured by the yardstick of conformity with the
language of the statute.”40 Unlike other New Dealers,
however, he publicly propounded a theory of law that eroded
the distinction between technical and normative expertise.
“Perhaps there is no greater obstacle to effective
governmental activity than the prevalent notion that the
‘law,’ at any given period of time, is moderately well known
or knowable,” Frank told a national gathering of social
workers in June 1933.41 Statutes and judicial opinions were
“extremely defective instruments of prediction as to what
courts will decide in particular future cases.”42 In fact, judges

38. Letter from Alger Hiss to Lawrence J. Nelson (Aug. 21, 1979), in
LAWRENCE J. NELSON, KING COTTON’S ADVOCATE: OSCAR G. JOHNSTON AND THE
NEW DEAL 87 (1999).
39. Id.
40. Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment Admin., Dairy
Marketing Agreements and Licenses at the American Institute of Cooperation 15
(July 9, 1934) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University
Library).
41. Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Couns., Agric. Adjustment Admin., Realistic
Reflections on “Law” as a Constructive Social Force (June 16, 1933) (on file with
the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
42. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Chairman Sec. Exch. Comm’n to
Leon Henderson, Comm’r Sec. Exch. Comm’n (July 31, 1939) (on file with the
Records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, National Archives, College
Park, Maryland).
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started “with what they consider a desirable decision and
then work[ed] backward to appropriate premises, devising
syllogisms” as they went until they arrived at an
aesthetically pleasing justification of “what they think just
and right.”43
Frank implied that the technical expertise of lawyers
consists in their ability to predict how a future judge would
decide a case. He depicted the process in a December 1933
address to the Association of American Law Schools. In it, he
conjured up a paradigmatic New Deal lawyer, Mr. Try-It.44
One day the young lawyer was asked to determine
whether, under a certain statute, a proposed program for the relief
of the destitute would be lawful. Mr. Try-it started with his
objective. “This,” he said, “is a desirable result. It is all but essential
in the existing crisis. It means raising the standard of living to
thousands. The administration is for it, and justifiably so. It is
obviously in line with the general intention of Congress as shown
by legislative history. The statute is ambiguous. Let us work out an
argument, if possible, so to construe the statute as to validate this
important program.”45

Certainly Mr. Try-It employed one form of Halliday’s
technical expertise, “skill in understanding statutes.”46 Note,
though, that statutory interpretation was the third step in
Mr. Try-It’s analysis. He started with his own belief that “the
relief of the destitute” was “a desirable result.”47 Even
verifying that the Roosevelt administration was “for” relief
was a secondary consideration.48
Frank did not say why Mr. Try-It’s notion of “a desirable
result” was a good predictor of what a future judge might

43. Jerome Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1063, 1065
(1934).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 1065.
46. HALLIDAY, supra note 6, at 39.
47. Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, supra note 43, at 1065.
48. Id.
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uphold.49 His most likely answer, I think, was that lawyers
trained in “the functional approach” could divine the
“immanent rationality in social life,” which the judge would
also heed.50 If this was indeed Frank’s notion of lawyers’
technical expertise, is it surprising that his adversaries
demurred and complained that his “principal interest in the
AAA was undoubtedly policy and not law”?51
After all, when AAA lawyers attempted to keep cotton
planters from evicting sharecroppers under Section 7 of their
benefits contract with the agency, several courses of action
might have seemed functional.52 Arguably, the social order
of the Cotton South required that sharecroppers received
shelter and a share of the AAA’s benefit payments. But
arguably, too, it required that planters agree to production
controls in future contracts with AAA, which they would
reject rather than give their sharecroppers a federally
enforceable possessory right. Could AAA lawyers really
predict which perception of social need would guide judges
when they interpreted the ambiguous language of Section
7?53
If bureaucracies and professions always marched toward
modernity in unison, then characterizing the lawyers’
contribution to the New Deal as simply the forging of
bureaucratic autonomy might suffice. But, like Brian Balogh,
I have found that they freely departed from the Weberian

49. Id.
50. See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1017, 1028 (1981). On the functional approach, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 20–35 (1986).
51. LEONARD D. WHITE, GOVERNMENT CAREER SERVICE 90–91 (1935).
52. The text of Section 7 of AAA’s 1934–1935 cotton contract appears in
CONRAD, supra note 21, at 58.
53. Here I follow Robert W. Gordon’s discussion of Frank. See Robert W.
Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal
and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES
75, 100–01, 105–07 (Anthony T. Kronman, ed., 2004).
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playbook.54 Working within agencies that were more
“bundles of rules, cognitive principles, or instruments” than
“order-making machines,” the New Deal lawyers’ goals set
them apart from and sometimes against their
administrators.55 Understanding the state they built
requires seeing them not simply as agents of American
political development but also as self-interested actors in
American political history.

54. See generally Brian Balogh, Reorganizing the Organizational Synthesis, 5
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 119 (1991).
55. See GERALD BERK, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS
CAPITALISM, 1900–1932, at 15–17 (2009).
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